Satisfaction, secrecy, and inequity in the problem of fair division

Greenwell, Raymond N. (2001) Satisfaction, secrecy, and inequity in the problem of fair division. In: Robert J. Bumcrot Festschrift, 11 May 2001, Hofstra University.

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Abstract

Two traditional criteria in the problem of fair division are proportionality, freedom from envy, and efficiency. To these we add two more: maximization of total satisfaction (the sum of all the players' evaluation of their own piece), and minimizing inequity. We show that these two criteria are inconsistent. We also show that secrecy of one's preferences, usually assumed in fair division, can be both advantageous and disadvantageous, depending upon the circumstances. (Note: Download the GIF file together with the paper in your preferred format.)

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Additional Information:	This paper was given at the Robert J. Bumcrot Festschrift on May 11, 2001.
Uncontrolled Keywords:	fair division
Subjects:	Q Science > Q Science (General) Q Science > QA Mathematics
ID Code:	33
Deposited By:	Admin HofPrints
Deposited On:	03 January 2006

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