Satisfaction, secrecy, and inequity in the problem of fair division
Greenwell, Raymond N. (2001) Satisfaction, secrecy, and inequity in the problem of fair division. In: Robert J. Bumcrot Festschrift, 11 May 2001, Hofstra University.
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Two traditional criteria in the problem of fair division are proportionality, freedom from envy, and efficiency. To these we add two more: maximization of total satisfaction (the sum of all the players' evaluation of their own piece), and minimizing inequity. We show that these two criteria are inconsistent. We also show that secrecy of one's preferences, usually assumed in fair division, can be both advantageous and disadvantageous, depending upon the circumstances. (Note: Download the GIF file together with the paper in your preferred format.)
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